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UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN AFRICA: A RIGHT APPROACH?

BY

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A system of enforced racial separation known as apartheid has been an official government policy of the Republic of South Africa since the National Party came to power in 1948. A major US policy goal has been the elimination of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial democracy committed to human rights and economic opportunity for all people of South Africa. Since 1986, US policy has been a combination of economic sanctions imposed by Congress

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with the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 and a continuation of the "constructive engagement" initiatives begun by the Reagan Administration during the early 1980s. Under "constructive engagement," the Administration sought an evolutionary process of reform in South Africa through diplomatic initiatives and a variety of assistance given to apartheid victims. This study assesses the effectiveness of current US policy in light of US interes in South Africa, the limitations of the policy, and the progress made toward stated policy goals. It concludes by proposing a future policy that will serve the US well in protecting and furthering its interests in Southern Africa.

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UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA: A RIGHT APPROACH?

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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A system of enforced racial separation know as apartheid has been an official government policy of the Republic of South Africa since the National Party came to power in 1948. A major US policy goal has been the elimination of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial democracy committed to human rights and economic opportunity for all people of South Africa. Since 1986, US policy has been a combination of economic sanctions imposed by Congress with the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 and a continuation of the "constructive engagement" initiatives begun by the Reagan Administration during the early 1980s. Under "constructive engagement," the Administration sought an evolutionary process of reform in South Africa through diplomatic initiatives and a variety of assistance given to apartheid victims. This study assesses the effectiveness of current US policy in light of US interest in South Africa, the limitations of the policy, and the progress made toward stated policy goals. It concludes by proposing a future policy that will serve the US well in protecting and furthering its interests in Southern Africa.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A system of enforced racial separation known as apartheid has been an official government policy in South Africa since the National Party came to power in 1948. Apartheid forms the basis for the political, economic, and social dominance of the South African white minority. A long list of racially discriminatory laws and policies have denied blacks equal rights and opportunities and have resulted in a history of racial protests and violence in South Africa that have left thousands of blacks killed, injured, and imprisoned. The discriminatory policies of South Africa led the Reagan Administration to seek reform through a foreign policy of "constructive engagement" which encouraged open communications between all parties in South Africa and an evolutionary process of peaceful reform. However, when reforms were slow to evolve, Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, over a presidential veto, to impose economic sanctions on South Africa. Therefore, since 1986, the US has pursued a two pronged policy toward South Africa: the Administration's initiatives of "constructive engagement" and the congressionally imposed economic sanctions. Although the term "constructive engagement" was no longer used after 1987 to describe US policy, the term will be used throughout this study to describe the Administration's initiatives that were begun prior to the congressionally imposed sanctions and which have continued until the present.

In 1986, economic sanctions became a primary aspect of US foreign policy and the basis of a nationwide debate as to their applicability and the degree

to which they should be imposed. The debate was recently renewed because of the announcements by Mr F. W. de Klerk, President of South Africa, in an opening address to the South African Parliament on 2 February 1990. He announced the intention to unban anti-apartheid groups in South Africa; to release the imprisoned Mr Nelson Mandela, former President of the anti-apartheid African National Congress; and to partially lift the state of emergency that has been in effect in South Africa since 1986. He called all parties to negotiate on the future of South Africa, improving the prospects for peaceful resolution of problems in that country. These announcements sparked immediate questions in the US and around the world as to whether sanctions should now be lifted.

The purpose of this research is to assess the effectiveness of US policy toward South Africa and propose a policy for the future. The current policy will be assessed in light of US interests in South Africa, the limitations of the policy, and the progress made toward stated US policy goals. The recommendations will propose refinements to US policy and policy initiatives that will serve the US well in protecting and furthering its interests in the future.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

To understand the nature of US policy toward South Africa and the reasons behind that policy, it is important to have a historical perspective of the racially discriminatory practices of the apartheid government and the actions of the major anti-apartheid groups. This chapter will briefly provide that perspective.

APARTHEID GOVERNMENT

The US Department of State provided an excellent description of apartheid and how it became a government policy of the Republic of South Africa:

> The system of enforced racial separation known as apartheid forms the basis for the political, economic, and social dominance of South Africa by the white minority. Apartheid - an Afrikaans word meaning "separateness" - was first introduced as government policy in South Africa in 1948. Prior to that time, the country's racial segregation practices were largely based on custom and tradition rather than ideological design. In 1948, the (Afrikaner) National Party came to power on a platform promising to codify and systematize existing segregation into a policy of "separate development" for whites, blacks, Indians, and "Coloureds" (mixed race). The introduction of more rigid segregation of the races in housing, education, and other social areas became known as "petty apartheid." Under Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd's administration (1958-1966), a parallel policy of "grand apartheid" was initiated to divide the country into separate, independent "homelands" for each of the legally designated black ethnic groups. Under this policy, all black Africans (representing over 74 percent of the population) were permanently denied political and residential rights in "white" areas comprising some 87 percent of South Africa's total land area, including the areas richest in natural resources and developed infrastructure.1

Many racially discriminatory laws and policies were enacted before and after apartheid became the law of the land. The major laws are summarized in Appendix 1. The laws limit the economic and educational development of blacks and deny them equal rights politically and socially. Between 1960 and 1983, over 3.5 million blacks were relocated to "homelands" by the government. Between 1975 and 1984, over 1.9 million blacks were arrested for violating the pass and influx control laws which controlled their movements within the country. Over 1.5 million South Africans work as migrants separated from their families. The laws deny equal rights to employment, and in 1988 the black average monthly wage was $175 compared to $1,000 for whites. Black unemployment has been estimated as high as 40 percent compared to less than 2 percent for whites. While there are an estimated 100,000 black-owned businesses in South Africa, they contribute only one percent to the gross domestic product (GDP). While there are 180,000 whites in management positions, there are only an estimated 2,860 blacks in such positions, even though blacks compose 74 percent of the South African population. Black education is inferior to that of whites as the government spent four times as much per capita on white education in 1986/87. White schools are less than full while black schools are overcrowded. In 1987, over one million blacks of school age were not attending school, and the literacy rate for blacks was 53 percent as compared to 98 percent for whites. The health programs for blacks are also inferior, contributing to an average life expectancy for blacks of 57.5 years as compared to 70 years for whites. In 1987, over 33 percent of rural black children under the age of five suffered from malnourishment, and the infant mortality rate for blacks was as high as 124 deaths per 1000 births as compared to 12.3 for whites.2,3

Under the protection of stringent security measures authorized by law, the apartheid security forces have used violent and repressive means to control demonstrations and uprisings of blacks in the country. One of the most violent actions occurred in Sharpeville on 21 March 1960, when police killed 69 people and wounded 180 others during a black national campaign against the pass laws. On 16 June 1976, police killed four students when 20,000 Soweto schoolchildren marched in protest against a government decision to make Afrikaans, the language of the ruling Afrikaner minority, a required language course in black schools. Violence erupted across the country as a result, and over 700 people died in the next 16 months. Violence again erupted in September 1984 when several local councils voted to raise township rents. This continued for the next 2 1/2 years, precipitating a government-imposed, nationwide state of emergency declared in June 1986 which is still in effect today. Since imposing the state of emergency, over 30,000 people have been detained, 10,000 of them under the age of 18. Most of them have been denied access to their families and legal counsel, and many have been subjected to cruel and inhumane punishment.4 Some of them died in confinement under questionable circumstances. One study found that 70 percent of detainees were physically assaulted, and at least 80 political prisoners have died since 1986 in police custody.5 Between September 1984 and January 1987, over 2200 blacks were killed during demonstrations.6 Although the level of violence in 1989 decreased due to some government reforms, a few deaths did occur, and security forces have used dogs and fire arms to control crowds.

ANTI-APARTHEID GROUPS

Resistance to the repressive and discriminatory practices of the apartheid government has ranged from terroristic activities to peaceful demonstrations to political initiatives. Violent activities reached their highest levels in the 1980s, and the number of anti-apartheid groups grew tremendously. Over thirty of the most active groups were banned by the government, and many of their leaders were imprisoned. However, many of the groups continued to pursue their activities from outside the country and underground or through legal fronts in country. Mr F.W. de Klerk, the President of South Africa, announced the unbanning of these groups in a speech to parliament on 2 February 1990. The most influential of anti-apartheid groups are the African National Congress (ANC), the United Democratic Front (UDF), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the Zulu Inkatha movement, the South African Communist Party (SACP), and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC).

African National Congress (ANC)

Formed in 1912, the ANC is the oldest nationalist movement in sub-Saharan Africa. Prior to the National Party assuming power in 1948, the ANC followed a moderate course emphasizing peaceful protests and propaganda. When the National Party intensified racial segregation, the ANC organized a program of African nationalism and mass action involving nonviolent tactics of civil disobedience, boycotts, strikes, and non-cooperation. In 1955, the ANC with three other organizations drafted the "Freedom Charter" which called for a multiracial democracy in which all national groups would have equal rights. Following the ANC-organized protest and subsequent massacre in Sharpeville on

21 March 1960, the government outlawed the ANC and later arrested several of its senior leaders. Among them was ANC President, Nelson Mandela, who has become the most popular individual of the anti-apartheid movement in the country. The ANC operates through legal fronts in South Africa, such as the United Democratic Front (UDF), as well as clandestinely.

When the ANC was banned, it went underground and formed a guerrilla wing that has conducted terrorist actions to further its goals. The strength of the ANC is estimated from 4,000 to 5,000. Members of its guerrilla wing are trained in Tanzania and Angola, and cells operate from most of the bordering nations into South Africa. The South African government has conducted cross-border strikes against the ANC which has contributed to regional unrest in Southern Africa. Until 1983, the ANC sought to avoid civilian casualties in its bombing attacks. After that, its attacks became more indiscriminate resulting in both black and white civilian victims. From June 1980 until July 1988, the ANC conducted 13 major bombing attacks, resulting in over 36 people killed and over 320 injured.7

There is evidence that several leaders of the South African Communist Party began infiltrating the ANC in 1950 and are now senior leaders of the organization. With several non-black leaders, the ANC openly began to advocate a multiracial, democratic South Africa governed by the principle of "one man, one vote, majority rule" rather than pure black nationalism. But the ANC also began to show a Marxist-Leninist ideology. In an ANC pamphlet published in 1969, the ANC spoke of a new world:

> ...a world which is no longer monopolized by the imperialist world system; a world in which the existence of the powerful socialist system has altered the balance of forces; a world in which the horizons liberated from foreign oppression extend beyond mere formal political control and encompass the element which makes such control

> meaningful - economic emancipation. In the last resort it is only the success of the national democratic revolution which - by destroying the existing social and economic relationships - will bring with it a correction of the historical injustices perpetrated against the indigenous majority and thus lay the basis for a new - and deeper internationalist - approach.8

The ANC has significant ties with the Soviet Union, from which it receives much of its support, and it has been consistently loyal to Moscow's policy line. For example, it condemned US "aggression" in Korea in the early 1950s, praised the Stalinist policies of the 1930s, and took Moscow's side in the Sino-Soviet dispute. A June 1985 statement in the ANC publication Sechaba reflects a Soviet-style strategy of a two-stage revolution in South Africa - a "national democratic" one and a "socialist" one:

> The national revolution...is the special province of the oppressed nationalities; the socialist revolution takes the form of class struggle led by the working class of all national groups. The two revolutions co-exist....They interact....They are as closely knit as Siamese twins. To separate them would need a surgical operation which might kill or cripple both.9

Nelson Mandela, now released, will likely play a significant role in representing blacks during future negotiations with the South African government. Having been imprisoned for over 27 years, it is not clear to what extent Mr Mandela may believe in the ideologies expressed above. It is also not clear to what extent he may be able to control the ANC and influence and unify all blacks in a common cause. He certainly has become a strong symbol of the anti-apartheid movement and appears to be one of most influential black leaders in South Africa.

UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT (UDF)

Beginning in 1983, the UDF grew rapidly as a multiracial alliance of over 400 different trade union, civic, church, and political organizations opposed

to the new 1983 constitution (which allowed some Coloured and Asian participation in the national government.) It pledged to work toward a single, nonracial, unfragmented South Africa. Many of the UDF's political views come from the ANC Freedom Charter, and it supports the ANC. It is the largest anti-apartheid group in South Africa.10 Although it has claimed to be independent of the ANC, some considered it to be the key legal front through which the ANC operated in South Africa. Some of its most prominent supporters are religious leaders of South Africa such as Anglican Bishop Desmond Tutu (black); Allan Boesak (colored), president of the World Alliance of Reform Churches; and Afrikaner clergyman Beyers Naude (white).11

CONGRESS OF SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE UNIONS (COSATU)

Formed in December 1985, COSATU is a federation of 36 black trade unions with approximately 600,000 members. It has become increasingly more powerful in organizing the black labor force as a political voice in South Africa. Although not formally associated with the ANC, COSATU is pro-ANC, anti-capitalist, and Marxist in ideology. It has endorsed the Freedom Charter and has called for closer ties with the UDF and worker organizations in Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines, Angola, and Mozambique. COSATU stated: "Workers throughout the world are victims of US-government-sponsored terrorism...in this country we are also victims of that kind of imperialism."12

ZULU INKATHA MOVEMENT

Inkatha, founded in 1928 as a Zulu cultural organization, remained in relative obscurity until 1974 when Chief Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi revived it to sidestep legal restrictions against black political activity. The Inkatha constitution, adopted in 1975, describes the organization as a "national

cultural movement" that "desires to abolish all forms of discrimination and separation." The movement is therefore broader than just a Zulu movement. Although Chief Buthelezi is chief minister of KwaZulu, the government-designated "homeland" of six million Zulu's, he and Inkatha reject "homeland" independence and stand for unified action. However, relations with the ANC, UDF, and other black groups have been strained, leading to black on black violence and many deaths. For example, during the week of 4-10 February 1990, 50 people were killed in such violence. Inkatha has opposed black consciousness leaders who have resisted participation in all "homeland" structures, and the competition of the Inkatha affiliated United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA) with other trade unions has created further stresses in the black community. As the leader of Inkatha with a membership of up to one million people, Chief Buthelezi should play a significant role in future negotiations between the apartheid government and black leaders.13

SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY (SACP)

The SACP was banned in South Africa in 1950. There is evidence that the SACP infiltrated the ANC after that and worked through other legal fronts in South Africa to carry on its activities. Those legal fronts include the Colored People's Congress (CPC), the Congress of Democrats (COD), and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU).14

PAN AFRICANIST CONGRESS (PAC)

Some of the more militant black members of the ANC who were impatient with the ANC leadership and who were uncomfortable with the extent of white and communist participation in the ANC, broke off to form the PAC in 1959. The overriding commitment of the PAC is a purified form of African

nationalism. The ANC and the PAC have cooperated on some initiatives. For example, they worked together to organize the Sharpeville protests in 1960 for which both groups were banned in South Africa.15 Their cooperative efforts are not the norm, however. The ANC has strongly criticized the PAC for its racist policies, and competition between the two fronts and their sympathizers is fierce and occasionally violent.16

ENDNOTES

1. A U.S. Policy Toward South Africa, Washington: U.S. Department of State, p. 19.

2. Ibid., p. 20.

3. Joshua Nessen, et al., Southern Africa Perspectives: South Africa Fact Sheet, pp. 1-4.

4. A U.S. Policy Toward South Africa, Washington: U.S. Department of State, p. 22.

5. Nessen, p. 4.

6. A U.S. Policy Toward South Africa, Washington: U.S. Department of State, p. 28.

7. Terrorist Group Profiles, pp. 129-130.

8. Michael Radu, "The African National Congress: Cadres and Credo," Problems of Communism, July-August 1987, p. 68.

9. Ibid., pp. 68-69.

10. A U.S. Policy Toward South Africa, Washington: U.S. Department of State, p. 28.

11. Radu, p. 66.

12. Ibid., p. 67.

13. A U.S. Policy Toward South Africa, Washington: U.S. Department of State, p. 27.

14. Radu, p. 61.

15. A U.S. Policy Toward South Africa, Washington: U.S. Department of State, p. 25.

16. Radu, pp. 62, 64.

CHAPTER III

US INTERESTS IN SOUTH AFRICA

The first step in the formulation of foreign policy is the determination of national interests upon which that policy will be based. The US has five broad interests in South Africa: (1) secure sea lines of communication, (2) strategic minerals, (3) other trade and investments, (4) stable regional environment with a pro-western alignment, and (5) promotion of human rights and democratic values.

SECURE SEA LINES OF COMMUNICATION

Many have expounded on the importance of South Africa to the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) around the Cape, which are vital to delivery of oil from the Persian Gulf and strategic minerals from Southern Africa. Interruption of these routes could have severe economic impact on the US and could be considered essential to the defense of the US homeland. Uninhibited movement around the cape is also important for flexibility in US naval power projection and sustainment of deployed fleet assets. However, the Cape is not a strategic maritime choke point such as the Strait of Gilbrator or the Suez Canal, and South Africa's importance to the security of the SLOCs is often exaggerated. The SLOCs can be much more easily cut at points in the Persian Gulf.

STRATEGIC MINERALS

The 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act prohibits imports from South African parastatal organizations (corporations or partnerships owned, controlled, or subsidized by the South African government) but exempts strategic minerals for which the President has certified that "quantities essential for the economy or defense of the United States are unavailable from reliable and secure suppliers."1 On 11 February 1987, the Department of State certified the ten strategic minerals shown in Figure 1. In 1986, South Africa led the world in production of three of the certified minerals (chromium, rutile, and vanadium) and ranked second in two others (manganese and platinum-group metals (PGMs).) South Africa also contains the largest known reserves that are economical to mine for four of the ten minerals: vanadium, manganese, chromium, and PGMs. In fact, South Africa has 74 percent or greater of the world's known reserves of the latter three minerals while the Soviet Union is second with much smaller reserves. (See Figure 3) South Africa is also believed to rank first in world production and reserve base for andalusite, but comprehensive worldwide data are not available. Additionally, more than half of the US imports of cobalt, which come from Zaire and Zambia, are shipped through South Africa because of unreliable rail and port facilities in those two countries.2 The second largest reserves of cobalt are in Cuba. The US has no economical reserves of any of these minerals, except for a very small reserve of PGMs. The US is therefore almost totally reliant on imports, mostly from or through South Africa. Figure 2 reflects the latest data on US import sources for the four most important strategic minerals.

Figure 1: SOUTH AFRICA'S PROPORTION OF U.S. CERTIFIED STRATEGIC MINERALS.3

	South Africa's Proportion (%) of:				
	U.S. Imports			World Mine Production	Current World Reserve Base
Minerals	1985	1986	1987	(1986)	
Andalusite	100	100	100	(a)	(b)
Antimony	14	19	14	13	5
Asbestos, chrysotile	8	4	4	2	1
Chromium	64	62	58	34	84
Cobalt	2	(d)	1	1	(c)
Diamonds, industrial	10	9	0.5	11(d)	8
Manganese	26	29	27	17	74
Platinum-group metals	46	43	46	46	89
Rutile	49	58	56	44	17(e)
Vanadium	34	37	34	53	47

a. There are no comprehensive worldwide data on andalusite. The two largest producers are South Africa and France, with estimated 1986 productions of 203,900 and 57,300 short tons respectively.
b. South Africa has known reserves of 56 million short tons.
c. Data unavailable but considered negligible.
d. Natural industrial diamonds only.
e. Includes rutile and ilenite suitable for making rutile substitutes.

Figure 2: U.S. IMPORT SOURCES FOR FOUR STRATEGIC MINERALS (%).5

	PGM	Manganese	Chromium	Cobalt
South Africa	44	27	61	
United Kingdom	16			
U.S.S.R.	9			
Gabon		14		
France		14		
Brazil		11		
Turkey			13	
Zimbabwe			9	
Yugoslavia			4	
Zaire				36
Zambia				20
Canada				17
Norway				9
Other	31	34	13	19

Figure 3: WORLD RESERVES OF FOUR STRATEGIC MINERALS:4

	PGM		Manganese		Chromium		Cobalt	
	Million Troy Oz	% Tot.	Million Tons	% Tot.	Million Tons	% Tot.	Thousand Tons	% Tot.
South Africa	1,900	88	2,900	74	5,700	84		
U.S.S.R.	200	9	500	13	102	1.5	150	4
U.S.	25	1						
Canada	9	0.4						
Gabon			190	5				
Australia			168	4				
Zimbabwe					750	11		
Turkey					70	1		
India					60	0.9		
Zaire							1,500	41
Cuba							1,150	32
Zambia							400	11
New Caldonia							250	7
World Total	2,140		3,900		6,800		3,650	
U.S. Yearly Comsumption	2.7		0.825		0.526		9.6	

These strategic minerals are crucial to US defense and domestic industry. Several of the minerals are required for the production of superalloys such as titanium that have the strength, light weight, and heat-resistant properties necessary for critical components of high technology equipment, i.e., aircraft engines; nuclear propulsion systems; tank, ship, missile, and aircraft structures; etc. In addition to high tech equipment, the minerals are required in the production of the high-strength, low-alloy steels that are used in hundreds of applications such as high-rise buildings, bridges, pipelines, and autos. The steel industry is the largest consumer of chromium, and andalusite is used in the linings of blast furnaces for making steels and superalloys. Some of the minerals are used as catalysts and are important in the auto, petroleum, chemical, and electronics industries, and in the medical and dental fields. For example, 40 percent of US consumption of PGMs is in

auto catalytic converters, crucial to the control of air pollutants. In most of the superalloy and catalytic applications, there are no feasible substitutes, and substitutions in other areas are limited. Recycling can meet some of the needs but is also limited. A major disruption in the supply of these minerals would have a serious impact across the US. For example, of the 77.5 million workers employed by the private sector in 1982, 46.6 million (60 percent) were employed by industries which directly consume chromium in their production processes.6

There is disagreement as to the extent of US dependence on South Africa for strategic minerals. While some US industrial spokesmen disagree, a 1988 US General Accounting Office study cited the Bureau of Mines and the Commerce and Defense Departments agreement that adequate, alternate sources are available for most of the strategic minerals, although at a higher cost:

> Except for two of the platinum group metals (platinum and rhodium), andalusite, and a specific type of industrial diamond and grade of chrysotile asbestos, alternative supply sources exist for the certified strategic minerals according to the Bureau of Mines data and Commerce and Defense Department officials, albeit at a higher cost. The Bureau of Mines report in 1988 estimated the 5-year cumulative direct economic cost of a US import embargo on 6 of the 10 certified minerals at $9.25 billion, or $1.85 billion annually. US industrial users of strategic minerals believe that the report understated the economic costs and overstated the ability of other mineral-producing nations to replace South African exports.7

Presently the US is dependent more on South Africa than it is on any other nation for strategic minerals vital to its defense and economic well-being. Not only does South Africa possess the greatest concentration of strategic minerals in the western world, it has developed a world-class technical capability, managerial competency, and industrial base for mineral exploitation. The US reserve and production of these minerals is almost non-

existent. The Soviet Union is virtually self-sufficient in these strategic minerals, and loss of South African imports would inevitably result in a greater dependence on the Soviet Union as an alternate supplier. Since 1983, only a small percentage of US imports of antimony, chromium, and industrial diamonds, and as high as 13 percent of PGMs, have come from the Soviet Union.8 If relations continue to improve between the Soviet Union and the US, increased imports of strategic minerals from the USSR may become a feasible alternative. Unless the USSR or other smaller, alternate sources are extensively developed, South Africa will continue to be of vital importance to the US as a source of strategic minerals.

OTHER TRADE AND INVESTMENTS

Other than strategic minerals, South Africa has not been important to the US in terms of trade and investments. In 1987, less than one half of one percent of US trade was with South Africa. Trade was only slightly higher prior to the 1986 US imposed sanctions. US trade, however, is much more important to South Africa. In 1987, US trade was 12.7 percent of South Africa's imports and exports. Since 1982 the US had fallen from second to fourth as the leading supplier of South African imports and from first to third as the leading market for South African exports, mostly because of economic sanctions and disinvestments.9

As with trade, US direct investments in South Africa are equally small in comparison with total US foreign investments. It was only $1.59 billion in 1987. But unlike trade, US investments are also of relatively minor importance to South Africa. Ninety percent of investment in South Africa comes from South Africa's own capital. The US accounts for less than

one-fifth of the ten percent derived from foreign sources, representing only two percent of the total direct investments in South Africa.10

While South Africa represents only a minor portion of total US foreign trade and investments, Africa as a whole has the potential for a much larger share if the problems preventing African development can be resolved. Currently, Africa in total represents less than three percent of US trade.11 South Africa can be an important partner in fostering stability and development in Southern Africa which would enhance trade and investments. In a field study, the Office of Strategic Resources of the US Department of Commerce concluded that "A favorable resolution of internal political problems could lead to the positioning of South Africa as a greater regional economic power with sufficient resources and know-how to stabilize and promote economic and social development throughout the entirety of Southern Africa."12 As a result, US trade and investment interest in South Africa beyond strategic minerals can be, although it is not currently, of major interest to the US.

FAVORABLE REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT

A stable regional environment in Southern Africa that is favorably aligned with the US is important for five reasons. First, a stable region is conducive to secure sources of strategic minerals that are vital to the US. Second, a stable, pro-Western environment reduces the opportunities for the Soviet Union, or its proxies, to exploit unrest and gain a stronger foothold in the region, although such Soviet exploitation appears to be declining due to their economic problems and their stated "new thinking" approach to international relations. Third, the US can more successfully promote democratic and human rights values in a stable environment. Fourth, through

the Organization of African States (OAS), Africa is becoming more united in international affairs and is now the largest political block in the world, representing 51 of 159 votes in the United Nations. A stable, pro-Western alignment is conducive to greater mutual support in international political forums. Fifth, conflict in Southern Africa is detrimental to economic development of the region and realization of its potential to be a major trading partner with the US in the future.

As the strongest nation, economically and militarily, in Southern Africa, South Africa plays a major role in the stability of the region. The operation of anti-apartheid groups, such as the African National Congress (ANC), out of neighboring nations has been a major cause of cross-border conflicts in the region. In the past year, those conflicts have been reduced as the ANC relied more on political and diplomatic initiatives rather than terrorist actions. Mr de Klerk, President of South Africa, has also pursued discussions with frontline nations which will facilitate peaceful resolution of problems. With the unbanning of anti-apartheid groups in South Africa as announced by Mr de Klerk on 2 February 1990, cross-border operations may be reduced even less in the future. In addition, withdrawal of South African and Cuban troops from Namibia and Angola was crucial to the Tripartite Agreement which led to reduced hostilities, free elections, and independence for Namibia on 1 April 1990. A resolution of racial problems in South Africa, withdrawal of South African troops from outside its borders, and improved relations between South Africa and its neighbors will contribute greatly to regional stability.

While South Africa continues to be the predominate power in Southern Africa, some observers argue that its hegemony is eroding and predict there could be a shift in the regional balance of power over the next ten to twenty

years. They attribute this to five factors: (1) the improving military capabilities of the Front Line States (Angola, Zambia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique) due to Soviet military assistance; (2) the United Nations arms embargo against South Africa and Israel's announced intentions not to negotiate new military contracts with South Africa; (3) the limited white manpower available in South Africa, which makes up 95 percent of their defense forces, as compared to the expanding ground forces of neighboring states; (4) the adverse economic trends and political turmoil in South Africa; and (5) the developing cohesion of Front Line States as evident by the formation of the nine-member Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), an association seeking economic independence from South Africa and greater collaboration on aid projects.13

As a pro-Western nation, South Africa's continued prominence in Southern Africa is important in offsetting Soviet influence which has developed through extensive military aid over the past several years. Soviet arms transfers to Africa far exceeded that of Western allies, amounting to over $19 billion between 1983 and 1987 as compared to $1.4 billion for the US.14 Furthermore, in 1987 the Warsaw Pact had 5890 military technicians in seven African countries, while 3270 African troops from six nations were being trained in the Warsaw Pact. In addition, Cuban troop levels in Africa reached over 50,000 in 1988.15

Contrary to this view, some observers argue that Soviet influence in Southern Africa has declined over the last decade and will decline even further in the coming years. They attribute the decline to two primary factors. Foremost is the inability of the Soviet Union to meet the economic development needs of Southern Africa. Since the Soviet industry is almost

totally geared toward military hardware production, Soviet aid has been primarily arms shipments and military technical assistance. For example, the ratio of Soviet arms sales to economic aid for sub-Saharan Africa has generally been ten to one.16 The Soviet economy has nearly collapsed under the strain of their own military buildup and their military aid to other countries. A second factor is a rise in African nationalism. In his article "Why Africa Matters," William Zartman emphasized that despite periodic changes in the political evolution of various African states, African nationalism remains the dominant ideology, an ideology not in tune with Marxist-Leninist worldviews. He indicated that African states shop around for the bargains of the moment, and lacking a deeply based ideological tie with the Soviet Union, become disenchanted with the Soviets when they discover the Soviets cannot meet their development needs.17 These changes are evident when one considers that 19 African states have made major shifts in their foreign policy alignments since their independence, some more than once.18

As a result of these factors, the Soviets in the foreseeable future are not likely to <u>create</u> opportunities for domination as they did in Afghanistan. However, they may take advantage of opportunities <u>afforded</u> them, especially in military assistance. Given such opportunities, the Soviets could increase conventional weapons shipments to third world nations utilizing weapons withdrawn from Europe because of the conventional force reductions talks with the US. This would depend of course on the terms of the agreement for disposal of the weapons. If able to take advantage of this, the Soviets could continue to provide arms to fuel conflicts where it is to their advantage without the drain on their economy of producing new weapons. It is therefore a major US interest to foster stability and pro-Western influence in Southern

Africa to reduce the likelihood of nations turning to the Soviet Union for assistance in time of need.

PROMOTION OF IDEOLOGICAL VALUES

Americans strongly believe in the democratic values and individual rights guaranteed them under the constitutional government. They thus have a strong desire to promote those values beyond their borders. South Africa is of special concern for three reasons. First, some Americans feel they have a cultural association with South African whites. There are nearly five million whites in South Africa of European descent who speak English and live in many respects as Americans do. Americans feel these South Africans should have the same values as they do. Second, 25 million Americans have ancestral ties with Africa.19 Many black Americans are especially critical of human rights issues in South Africa and have voiced strong protests which have had significant impact on US policy toward South Africa. Protests of American citizens were a primary reason behind congressional action to pass the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. Finally, and most important, human rights violations in South Africa are much more visible than in other countries. The racially oppressive system of apartheid is codified in law, and racism is an open, official policy of the apartheid government. Strong anti-apartheid groups such as the ANC keep world-wide visibility on the issue through their international organizations. While there are major human rights violations occurring in other African countries and around the world, South Africa has the most visibility and therefore arouses the strongest protests of Americans.

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CHAPTER IV

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY GOALS AND INITIATIVES

Foreign policy cannot be formulated and implemented for one nation in isolation. In a world of interdependent political and economic interests, effective foreign policy must be consistent, and it must be applied within the broader context of regional foreign policy. Thus, US foreign policy goals for South Africa must reflect the broader goals for Southern Africa. According to Edward J. Perkins, former US Ambassador to South Africa, there are four goals of US foreign policy in Southern Africa: (1) elimination of apartheid and establishment of a non-racial democracy committed to protecting human rights and promoting economic opportunity for all people of South Africa; (2) continued supply of key strategic minerals; (3) maintenance of American influence through mutually productive diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with nations in the region; and (4) elimination of regional tensions which could escalate into superpower confrontations.1 These goals clearly reflect the US interests discussed in the previous chapter. Since 1986, the US foreign policy implemented to attain these goals has been a combination of the Administration's initiatives of "constructive engagement" and economic sanctions imposed by Congress in the 1986 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. Although the term "constructive engagement" is no longer used to describe US policy, it will be used in this study when referring to the Administration's initiatives begun under "constructuve engagement" which have continued to the present.

CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT

The US policy toward South Africa implemented by the Reagan Administration prior to the 1986 congressionally imposed sanctions was "constructive engagement." It was a political and socio-psychological interface that encouraged open communication and an evolutionary process of peaceful reform. It was based on the belief that problems in South Africa must be solved by South Africans, and a US resolution cannot be forced upon them. Therefore the aim of "constructive engagement" was to promote positive dialogue and negotiations between the South African government and the leaders of its black community.2 The policy also encouraged open communications between South Africa and other Southern African nations with respect to regional problems. Diplomacy was the primary means for the pursuit of open communications. Although minor sanctions were in effect against South Africa, primarily in the area of arms shipments, the initiatives described below composed the primary aspect of US policy until stronger congressionally-imposed sanctions became the more visible aspect of policy in 1986. The Administration continued to pursue these initiatives after 1986, however, and even expanded them.

In concert with the diplomatic pursuit of constructive dialogue, the US provided assistance to South African blacks and other nonwhites to better prepare them to cope with and resolve their problems. In the 1980s through the American Embassy in Pretoria, the US provided $1 million per year to groups in South Africa that work for economic, social, legal and political change. The money was used for such things as seminars on human rights and legal aid for victims of apartheid. The US also provided $8 million per year for scholarships for black and other nonwhite South Africans to attend

American and South African universities. Another $1 million program, administered through the AFL/CIO, trained black and other nonwhite union leaders in union management, negotiation, and organization. A $2 million program helped black high school students prepare for university entrance exams, and a $3 million dollar program trained blacks to start small businesses. Similarly, the International Visitor and Fullbright programs assisted by bringing numerous South Africans to visit or study in the US. Other programs brought black journalists to work with the US media and black teachers to build skills at US educational institutions.3 These initiatives, which are characteristic of "constructive engagement," have continued and have expanded, amounting to approximately $34 million in 1989.4

In addition to direct US government assistance, the US encouraged American corporations in South Africa to play a constructive role for change by adopting a set of standards known as the Sullivan Principles developed by Reverend Leon Sullivan, an American civil rights leader. The principles called for equal pay for equal work, a fair minimum wage, placement of disadvantaged South Africans in administrative and managerial positions, fair labor practices, and the right to form and join labor unions. Additional principles called for desegregation of all corporation facilities; improvement of quality of life for workers outside the workplace through subsidies for housing, recreation, health, and educational programs; and establishment of training programs to prepare nonwhites for supervisory, administrative, and technical jobs. By 1986, 192 firms in South Africa had adopted the Sullivan Principles and were playing a major role in assisting the under privileged in South Africa.5

COMPREHENSIVE ANTI-APARTHEID ACT OF 198^

Through the years of "constructive engagement," several minor reforms were implemented by the Pretoria government, but apartheid remained strong and continued its racially oppressive actions. This led to two years of widespread violence in South Africa in 1984-1986 in which over 2,000 blacks were killed and led to large domestic protests in the US for stronger anti-apartheid measures.6 In 1985, through Presidential Executive Orders 12532 and 12535, President Reagan imposed minor economic sanctions on South Africa in an attempt to head off larger congressional imposed sanctions. Despite this, in 1986 Congress passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, overriding a Presidential veto by a large margin. The act contains four broad provisions: (1) provides guidelines for US policy in southern Africa and imposes economic sanctions against South Africa, (2) provides impetus for the President to obtain foreign cooperation for imposing the sanctions, (3) authorizes measures to assist the victims of apartheid, and (4) requires reports by the administration on certain political, economic, social, and legal issues concerning South Africa.7

The sanctions act prohibits trade of certain products with South Africa, various financial transactions, and other activities. The ban on imports include (1) gold coins, (2) uranium, (3) iron and steel, (4) coal, (5) agricultural products, (6) textiles, (7) military articles, (8) and products from parastatals (companies owned, controlled, or subsidized by the South African government.) Strategic minerals certified by the President are excluded from the ban. The ban on US exports to South Africa include (1) oil, (2) many items on the US Munitions List, (3) nuclear materials and technology, and (4) computers destined for apartheid-enforcing agencies such as the police

and the military. The ban on financial transactions include (1) new US loans to government and private entities, (2) new US investments except in firms owned by black South Africans, and (3) South African government and parastatal deposits in US banks. Other terminated activities are (1) air transportation to and from South Africa, (2) the treaty between the US and South Africa preventing double taxation, (3) US government promotion of tourism in South Africa, (4) the use of US government funds to subsidize trade or investment in South Africa, and (5) US military cooperation with South Africa except intelligence gathering.8

The passage of the Anti-Apartheid Act in 1986 placed economic sanctions visibly at the forefront of US policy. However, the initiatives of "constructive engagement" to assist blacks continued and even expanded after 1986, although the term "constructive engagement" was no longer used. Such assistance was authorized by the Act. Although the pursuit of "constructive dialogue" with all parties continued after passage of the Act, such a cooperative effort was more difficult because the Act created an adversarial policy in an attempt to force change on the Pretoria government. The US policy after 1986 was thus a combination of sanctions and "constructive engagement" initiatives.

ENDNOTES

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CHAPTER V

LIMITATIONS OF US FOREIGN POLICY

Why has US foreign policy failed to bring an end to apartheid? To understand this, one must realize that the racially oppressive social system in South Africa is over 300 years old. The ruling white minority will not give up its social customs and way of life unless it perceives a direct, substantial, and long-term threat to its well-being that overshadows the benefits it believes are derived from apartheid. In 1987, the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on South Africa stated, "The ability of any U.S. administration to induce, force, or ensure specific outcomes is limited ... the United States lacks the economic or political leverage to compel the white government to end apartheid and negotiate with its opponents."1 The US Administration's policy of "constructive engagement" followed prior to 1986 was limited in the amount of direct pressure that could be brought upon the Pretoria government, and the evolutionary approach to change that it encouraged was a slow process. As a result, Congress directed a shift in US policy in 1986, and economic sanctions became the primary instrument of US policy. To pose a significant threat to apartheid, economic sanctions must have substantial leverage, and the sanctions must be strictly enforced. In this respect, reports on the impact of economic sanctions have received mixed reviews. This chapter will address the limitations of economic sanctions on trade and corporate investments in South Africa.

TRADE SANCTIONS

The impact of economic sanctions on South Africa have been tempered because of South Africa's self-sufficiency and its importance in the world strategic mineral market. South Africa is a country rich in natural resources. It is self-sufficient in food stuffs, and it has prepared itself over the years for sanctions by stockpiling its imported raw materials, primarily crude oil and bauxite.2 As discussed in Chapter II, South Africa is the world's largest producer of diamonds, gold, and strategic minerals (PGMs, manganese, chromium, and andalusite), and it's economy is strong with several close trading partners in addition to the US.3 World dependence on vital, strategic minerals from South Africa, or from border nations that depend on South African ports and transportation systems, has tempered world imposition of economic sanctions. Even US sanctions are tempered because of US reliance on strategic minerals from or through South Africa. Without South African minerals, the US would have to rely on imports from the Soviet Union as the total world production from all other nations could only meet 40 percent of US needs.4

Some of the sanctions that have been imposed on South Africa have not been well enforced, reducing their potential impact. Sixty-five percent of South Africa's exports are low-bulk, high value exports such as diamonds and strategic minerals which are hard to control.5 Companies have hidden the source and destination of products by forging documents, diverting ships and tankers, shipping products through third and fourth countries, mixing products of several nations, and labeling products from other countries after completing relatively small portions of their manufacture in those countries. For example, the DeBeers-Anglo American group, which controls 80 percent of

the world's diamonds, mixes gems from South Africa with those from Botswana, Australia, the Soviet Union, and other nations at its bimonthly London diamond auctions. South African and Chinese coal is mixed at Rotterdam. The Taiwanese Chia Ho group falsely labeled 140,000 South African-made flannel shirts as made in Swaziland, and 48,968 pairs of sandals imported to Canada with "Made in Lesotho" labels were actually produced in South Africa. In other examples of "sanction busting," South Africa's Met Ker Investments Ltd. set up a factory in Swaziland to put Swazi handles on steel pots made in South Africa, and South Africa's biggest textile firm, the Frame Group, opened a Swaziland factory to wind large balls of South African yarn into small skeins for export as a Swaziland product.6 Many companies in South Africa and around the world have found ingenious ways, some legal and some illegal, to avoid some of the sanctions.

Embargoes have been equally ineffective in some instances. Despite an oil embargo, half of South African oil imports flow through two refineries run by US companies, Mobil and Caltex. South Africa continues to receive oil from European firms, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Iran, and Brunei. However, the oil embargo has made oil more expensive for South Africa. Congressman Robert Wise (D-WV), Congress' leading oil sanctions advocate, estimates that South Africa spends $2.3 billion a year above the world market price to obtain its oil covertly. Companies are also evading the arms embargo to South Africa as evident by 28 instances of illegal shipments from the US that have been investigated by the GAO since 1986. Weapons also continue to flow to South Africa from Germany, Israel, and Chile.7

Making sanctions and embargoes even more difficult, South Africa has been able to develop many new import and export sources. As a result, much of

South Africa's import and export business has remained relatively stable. For example, while 80 percent of South Africa's traditional steel export markets closed, their steel exports decreased only 2.9 percent. It is estimated that if full sanctions in all areas were implemented, South African exports could be cut by only 25 percent.8

Although the impact has been less than its full potential, economic sanctions on South Africa have had a significant impact. In a 1988 study, the GAO estimated that during the first three quarters of 1987 as compared to 1986, South Africa lost $417 million in exports to the US and $51 million in exports to 22 other countries for a $469 million dollar loss in export of the US sanctioned commodities. The loss was 5.7 percent of South Africa's total exports of $11 billion in 1987. The impact could have been much greater if international sanctions had been as effective as those of the US. The reduction in South African exports of these commodities to the 22 other nations was only 1.6 percent. Much of the decrease was offset by a 28.4 percent increase in agricultural exports from South Africa to these nations. This is still a significant impact, however, when considering that world exports, excluding South Africa, to these nations increased by 17.7 percent during the same period.9

A similar adverse trend for South Africa is evident when comparing the total trade figures over a longer period for 26 countries that report to the International Monetary Fund. Between 1982 and 1987, world exports to these countries increased by 48.8 percent while South Africa's exports to them decreased one percent. Similarly, world imports from these countries increased 50.4 percent during this period while South African imports decreased 13.1 percent.10 Part of this impact can be attributed to

international sanctions imposed on South Africa. Over 80 percent of South African trade is with six major trading partners: Japan, Italy, the United States, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and France. Between 1982 and 1987, each of these nations, except Japan, reduced both their imports from and exports to South Africa as a percentage of their total world trade. Japan reduced its exports to South Africa but increased its imports.11 (See Fig 4)

Figure 4: TRADE STATISTICS OF SIX MAJOR SOUTH AFRICAN TRADING PARTNERS.12

	Imports From South Africa As Percentage Of Total Imports		Exports To South Africa As Percentage Of Total Exports	
	1982	1987	1982	1987
United States	0.80	0.33	1.12	0.51
Japan	1.42	1.63	1.19	0.81
Italy	1.85	1.43	0.74	0.39
United Kingdom	1.32	0.70	2.16	1.19
West Germany	0.82	0.55	1.44	0.87
France	0.64	0.37	0.67	0.32

From another perspective, some experts argue that economic sanctions have hurt the blacks in South Africa more than the whites. Most of the companies that disinvested sold their investments to whites, while few sold to black investors. Most of the businesses which continued operations under South African white management retained a majority of the work force, but some jobs were lost, mostly in the black labor market. In addition, with 162 US businesses gone, many of the programs that supported blacks have not continued at the same level under South African white management, i,e., equal employment opportunity, black managerial development, and support of black social and community development programs.13 For example, in 1986 there were 165 US signatories of the Sullivan Principles, but the number dropped to 90 by

October 1987, primarily due to US corporate withdrawal.14 Prior to 1986, US companies invested over $100 million for education and other programs to improve the lives of black South African workers.15 The yearly investment has now been significantly reduced. On the positive side, some companies did establish employee-share-ownership plans prior to departure that helped black workers. Ford put 24% and Coca-Cola put 11% of their interests in such plans.16

DISINVESTMENTS

The impact of US corporate disinvestments in South Africa has been less effective than trade sanctions. Leverage is small because 90 percent of direct investments in South Africa is from internal sources, and only 1/5 of the remaining 10 percent is from the US. In other words, only two percent of total direct investments in South Africa are US investments.17 The withdrawal of a portion of such a small amount would have little impact. Furthermore, while 162 companies have withdrawn from South Africa since 1984, over half of all US firms, US direct investment dollars increased four percent when adjusted for fluctuation in the exchange rate. This increase is largely the result of significant reinvested earnings which is not prohibited by the sanctions act. Historically, about 80 percent of all direct investment in South Africa has come from reinvestment of profits. Investments increased nearly 10 percent from 1984 (when corporate withdrawal began) until 1986, but the increase was then partially offset by a 5 percent decline after enactment of the sanctions act. Indirect investments in stocks and bonds was somewhat different with a moderate decrease during the period.18

Not only has the dollar value of direct investments in South Africa increased, but the corporate departure has done more harm than good in some ways. Sixty percent of the withdrawing companies sold their operations to South Africans - virtually all whites - at bargain prices, contributing to greater South African white economic control. Some companies retained their profit potential through licensing, franchise, and distribution rights or by moving their plants to border nations. For example, Coca-Cola sold its 12 bottling plants but moved its beverage concentrate factory, its main profit source, to Swaziland. General Motors signed a manufacturing licensing agreement with its former subsidiary who is doing even better because it now sells vehicles to the South African police and military which GM would not do.19 Both the subsidiary and the South African government have benefited from the disinvestment. Few US goods have disappeared from South African shelves despite corporate withdrawals.

Although there have been significant limitations in the effectiveness of US policy, progress has been made toward the achievement of foreign policy goals. These achievements will be discussed in Chapter VI.

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CHAPTER VI

ACHIEVEMENTS IN FOREIGN POLICY GOALS

It is difficult to assess to what extent US policy has precipitated reforms in South Africa. There are numerous internal and external factors that influence the actions of the Pretoria government which include international and domestic economic and political pressures. Although specific reforms cannot be attributed directly to US policy, a general assessment of reforms made during the last few years can help draw a conclusion as to the adequacy or inadequacy of US policy in setting a climate conducive to reform. In particular, a comparison of reforms made during the era of "constructive engagement" with those made since imposition of economic sanctions will shed light on the relative effectiveness of these two approaches.

Most of the reforms made during P. W. Botha's leadership of the National Party (1978-1989) were made prior to imposition of sanctions in 1986. The reforms were primarily directed toward reducing "petty apartheid" laws and policies that mandated official, racial separation and discrimination without endangering continued white control of the political and economic systems. The most important of these reforms are listed in Appendix 1. Generally, the reforms accomplished the following: (1) gave blacks more freedom of movement in the country by easing restrictions, releasing thousands detained or serving sentences for violating influx control laws, and allowing blacks to acquire property in black townships; (2) deracialized labor laws by discontinuing most white job reservations, legalizing black labor unions, and allowing greater

freedom for blacks to work and to establish businesses in white areas; (3) extended limited self-government to black townships and extended citizenship and limited, local political rights to blacks residing outside of homelands; (5) extended limited national political rights to "Coloureds" and Asians through formation of a third parliament; (6) abolished the immorality and mixed marriage laws; (7) discontinued racial quotas for universities to allow admittance based on academic qualifications only; and (8) desegregated some hotels, restaurants, and theaters.1,2 Since these reforms were implemented before the economic impact of the Anti-Apartheid Act could be felt, any US influence can almost entirely be attributed to the policy of "constructive engagement." Sanctions may have had some indirect impact, however, as the Pretoria government may have implemented some reforms in an attempt to forestall the sanctions being considered by Congress.

Although no further reforms of significance were implemented by South Africa in the first three years following passage of the Anti-Apartheid Act (1986-1988), there was a significant growth of the anti-apartheid movement within both the black and white sectors of South Africa. There was a tremendous growth in black labor unions which played a role to some extent in improving wages and working conditions of blacks, in developing effective black leaders, and in uniting blacks into more effective political groups. For example, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) formed in 1985 is a federation of 36 black trade unions with approximately 600,000 members. It has become a powerful political voice for blacks in South Africa. There have also been an increasing number of strong statements against apartheid by leading business organizations in South Africa. The Dutch Reformed Church, South Africa's largest white denomination, once found a

biblical basis for apartheid, but has now denounced the ideology of apartheid as a sin and a conflict with the teachings of the scriptures.3 Similarly, there has been a significant growth in the number of South African whites calling for an end to racial discrimination and the initiation of negotiations with black leaders. Public opinion surveys indicate as many as two-thirds of whites now view power-sharing with blacks as inevitable. Within the House of Assembly, a new liberal wing of the National Party has emerged as a lobby against the overcautious and slow reforming policies of the government. In addition, there has been a greater number of prominent Afrikaner and English speaking white professionals calling for and engaging in talks with the ANC.4

In the last year, additional events give some glimmer of hope that progress toward peaceful solutions in South Africa and within the region will be made. Cross-border conflicts between Southern African nations decreased, and Namibia gained independence follwoing withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops from Angola and Namibia. In South Africa, several key political detainees were released, and the death sentences of the "Sharpeville Six" and two policemen were commuted.5 Hope for further reforms in South Africa came with the election of F. W. de Klerk as President and leader of the South African National Party in September 1989. His election has been viewed as a mandate for change from 75 percent of whites in South Africa. As a result, Mr de Klerk has taken a more positive approach toward reforms as evident by six initiatives he took during his first three months in office: (1) allowed peaceful protests against apartheid; (2) held discussions on the future of South Africa with prominent black leaders such as Mr Mandela, Mr Sisulu, Archbishop Tutu, and Reverend Allan Boesak; (3) released additional political detainees, including Mr Sisulu, a leader in the ANC;

(4) desegregated South African beaches and announced that the Separate Amenities Act would be repealed during the next session of parliament, desegregating all public facilities; (5) reduced the authority of state security forces by abolishing the state security management system and returning security matters to the control of the civilian cabinet; and (6) reduced the military budget and reduced the role of the military in domestic and foreign policy formulation.6 These actions are an indication of the sincerity and commitment of Mr de Klerk to bring about reforms, thereby opening the door for serious negotiations toward a peaceful change.

Although progress has been made in eliminating some "petty apartheid" legislation and policies, the ultimate goal of US policy – an end to "grand apartheid" – has not been realized. Blacks still are not free to live where they desire, to patronize establishments they desire, to benefit from good education and health care, or to exercise a right to vote. This is evident by the continued existence of four primary pillars of the apartheid government: (1) the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act which established separate "homelands" for the majority of blacks; (2) the Native Lands Act which assigned 87 percent of South African land to the whites who are only 13 percent of the population; (3) the 1950 Group Areas Act which assigned neighborhoods by race; and (4) the 1950 Population Registration Act, the foundation of the South African political system, which divided the South African people into four racial or ethnic groups of whites, blacks, coloreds, and indians.7 Because of the mostly segregated education and health care systems of South Africa, some white schools and hospitals are under utilized while most black institutions are over crowded.8 The only likely avenue toward elimination of these pillars of "grand apartheid" will be serious

negotiations in which both sides are able to compromise and reach agreements that will guarantee equitable rights for all people of South Africa.

Both sides have stipulated conditions that must be met before negotiations can begin. The ANC, recognized as the most influential anti-apartheid group, has stated four conditions: (1) the release of Mr Mandela and all other political prisoners, (2) the unbanning of the ANC, (3) the end to the state of emergency imposed in 1986, and (4) a willingness of the apartheid government to enter serious negotiations leading to a democratic, non-racial government. Mr de Klerk's condition was that anti-apartheid groups seek peaceful reform and denounce violence. During his address to the South African Parliament on 2 February 1990, Mr de Klerk partially met the ANC's conditions. He announced (1) the unbanning of the ANC and over 30 other anti-apartheid groups; (2) the unconditional release of Mr Mandela and other political prisoners; and (3) the partial lifting of the state of emergency. Subsequent to the announcement, Mr Mandela was released on 11 February. In his address, Mr de Klerk stated "the door to South Africa is open" and called black leaders to negotiations.

The stage is thus set for the most hopeful progress toward a peaceful end to apartheid since its beginning in 1948. The road to that end, however, is still long and difficult with many potential obstacles along the way. The ANC is calling for the full lifting of the state of emergency and release of all political prisoners, including those convicted of terrorist activities, before negotiations can begin. Although the Pretoria government has not agreed to those conditions, it has been announced that negotiations will begin in April 1990. At the extreme right, the Conservative Party whites are showing greater solidarity in resisting Mr de Klerk's initiatives and a

potential willingness to use force if necessary. South Africa is thus in precarious times that could erupt into a new wave of violence if blacks or right wing whites grow impatient. Success will depend on whether both sides are willing to compromise enough to establish a democracy that will ensure the rights of South African blacks, coloreds, and indians, while assuring whites of some reasonable control over their destiny.

ENDNOTES

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7. U.S. Department of State, A U.S. Policy Toward South Africa, p. 22.

8. Akhalwaya, p. 15.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

Considering the difficulty of the task of dismantling apartheid, the progress that has been made, and more importantly the progress that is looming over the horizon, one can logically conclude that US policy toward South Africa has been effective. The process of negotiations between blacks and whites in South Africa is close at hand. Negotiations will hopefully lead to the end of the apartheid government and to the beginning of a democratic government with equality for all South Africans. In assessing the effectiveness of US foreign policy, the question is not whether progress has been made, but whether the US policy was the best approach for bringing about the maximum progress in minimum time. That is a question that cannot be answered with certainty.

In the past, some argued that the Pretoria government must be forced into making changes and that full sanctions and nearly complete cut of ties with South Africa was the only way to bring about meaningful change. Others argued that sanctions are mostly ineffective and hurt the wrong people. They argued that a "constructive engagement" approach is necessary to keep communications lines open between parties and to create a positive atmosphere where support and assistance from the US will lead to successful negotiations. The US policy has been a compromise between these approaches.

In compromising, however, the US sent mixed signals about South Africa. The policy seemed to be in disarray and a reflection of conflict between the Administration and Congress. After Congress voted overwelhmingly to impose

sanctions and after the President's own Advisory Committee on South Africa reported in February 1987 that the policy of "constructive engagement" was unsuccessful, the administration remained committed to friendly persuasion as the means to end apartheid. Despite the release of a State Department report in early 1988 that identified communist influences in the ANC, Secretary of State George Shultz met with ANC leader Oliver Tambo on 28 January 1988. This first official meeting between the US and the ANC, in effect, recognized the ANC as a legitimate actor in South African politics. Additionally, in February 1988, despite the sanctions imposed by Congress on South Africa, the US vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution calling for selective sanctions against South Africa. Also, the administration reinterpreted the Anti-Apartheid Act to allow imports of previously banned South African uranium as long as the uranium was intended for reexport.1 These seemingly contradictory actions could have led South Africa to hope for support from Washington and could have slowed the process of change.

In other respects, the compromised approach may have facilitated the process of change. The positive approach of "constructive engagement" created an atmosphere for open dialogue and US assistance while sanctions impressed upon Pretoria the urgency of the problem and US resolve to take strong measures if necessary. In essence, the President and the State Department took the soft approach which facilitated a cooperative attitude in the behind scenes dialogue while Congress played the bad guy by imposing sanctions which told Pretoria we meant business and met the demands of an emotional American public on the issue. It is impossible to second guess which approach might have brought about quicker reforms in South Africa. One thing is clear, however. South Africa is at an open door leading to a brighter future through

peaceful negotiations, and they stepped up to that door while the US followed the compromising policy described above.

Only South Africans themselves can bring about lasting change in South Africa, and any reforms that evolve are the work of South Africans, not a direct result of US policy. Five primary conclusions can be drawn at this point: (1) US foreign policy has helped facilitate positive reforms in South Africa and has helped build the momentum for more significant reforms in the future; (2) while there are dramatic opportunities for peaceful change in South Africa, the negotiations will be difficult and obstacles could prevent success unless both sides are willing to make significant concessions; (3) impatience and unwavering demands could close the door to peaceful negotiations and lead to a new wave of violence; (4) the prospects for peace in Southern Africa will be greater than ever if peaceful resolutions are successful in South Africa; and (5) the US can play a major facilitator role in the pursuit of peaceful resolutions.

Some of the fruits of US policy in South Africa are evident. Through the avenues of a "constructive engagement" approach, the black majority in South Africa is stronger and able more than ever before to deal with apartheid to bring about change. The legal, economic, educational, and political assistance given to victims of apartheid by the US government and private organizations has contributed to a rise in black political and economic empowerment. Black political groups and labor unions have grown tremendously and have become very effective in organizing black resistance. The number of black businesses has also grown. According to Dr. Piet Koornhof, South African Ambassador to the US, black businesses now are one half of all businesses in South Africa, and there is an emerging black middle class.2

The dividends of a US "constructive" approach to maintaining open lines of communication between parties is also evident. At the forefront is the agreement for independence of Namibia which would not have been possible without the direct involvement of the US in bringing the sides to the negotiating table and facilitating compromises and agreements. This set the stage and built the credibility of the US as a facilitator of peaceful solutions. With this foundation, the US has pursued discussion with South Africa and other frontline nations to bring an end to crossborder violence in Southern Africa. In South Africa, the US has pressed for peaceful negotiations through dialogue with black leaders and the Pretoria government. There is now an atmosphere more conducive to negotiations, evident by the initiatives of Mr de Klerk to meet with black leaders (such as Mr Sisulu, Mr Mandela, and Archbishop Tutu) and leaders of border nations such as Mozambique. The desire of Mr Mandela to pursue peaceful change in South Africa is a result of a developed atmosphere that shows promise for effective negotiations.

Despite the limited US economic leverage and problems with sanctions highlighted in Chapter V, the impact of US and worldwide sanctions cannot be denied. Segments of the South Africa economy have been significantly effected and the billions of dollars in lost trade has held the growth of the South African gross national product well below its potential. According to Ambassador Koornhof, without sanctions South Africa could have reached a 9-15 percent growth rate compared to the current rate of two percent.3 The imposition of the somewhat limited sanctions, and more importantly the realization of the potential of more severe sanctions, no doubt weighed heavily on the minds of many South African whites, especially in light of the

growing empowerment of 25 million blacks in South Africa. Seventy-five percent of whites in South Africa's election last September voted a mandate to Mr de Klerk for change and whites supported a political role for blacks three to one.4

The results of the South African election, the growth of black empowerment, the denouncement of apartheid actions by the Dutch Reformed Church, the initiatives of Mr de Klerk for change, and other positive signs in South Africa all point to the prospect for success in the negotiations that will begin in April 1990. Whites want assurance of peaceful negotiations and a strong role in the after-apartheid government that will ensure favorable control over their destiny. Mr Mandela, who will likely be a prominent black voice in the negotiations, has already indicated his desire to pursue those ends. If he consolidates the support of major black organizations, and in particular the younger more militant members of those organizations, he will be able to take a significant step in negotiations. The Pretoria government, on the other hand, must assure whites and appease the right wing Conservative Party if it is to maintain white support throughout the negotiations.

ENDNOTES

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3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

CHAPTER VIII

RECOMMENDATIONS

What should be the US policy toward South Africa in the future? Should it be modified or should it remain the same? After the recent initiatives of Mr de Klerk, some have suggested the US consider canceling economic sanctions. This, however, would be premature. South Africa has only stepped up to the door of opportunity. They have not yet stepped through the door to begin negotiations nor have they taken any significant steps toward dismantling "grand apartheid." The US must maintain a steady course now, one that has facilitated progress to this point, but remain flexible to respond to substantial progress, or lack of it, in the future.

The goals of US policy in Southern Africa discussed in Chapter IV and repeated here are still valid: (1) elimination of apartheid and establishment of a non-racial democracy in South Africa; (2) continued supply of key strategic minerals; (3) maintenance of American influence through diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with nations in Southern Africa; and (4) elimination of regional tensions which could escalate into superpower confrontation. As pointed out in this research, South Africa is the key to attainment of these goals in Southern Africa, and elimination of the racial problems of apartheid will contribute to the accomplishment of the other three goals. Pursuit of these goals will facilitate the protection of the US interests in South Africa discussed in Chapter III: (1) secure sea routes, (2) strategic minerals, (3) other trade and investments, (4) stable regional

environment with pro-Western alignment, and (5) promotion of human rights and democratic values.

Because of South Africa's importance to the stability and development of Southern Africa, US foreign policy toward South Africa should support policy goals both within South Africa and within the broader, Southern African region. From this perspective, therefore, these are the policy recommendations of this study:

a. Seek the abolition of apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial democracy in South Africa that guarantees equal political, economic, and social opportunity for all people of South Africa. Pursue this goal in the following ways:

(1) Continue with the economic sanctions imposed by the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act until substantial progress is made through peaceful negotiations. Sanctions indicate US resolve and should not be lifted until it is clear that the goal of a non-racial, democratic government in South Africa will be reached. Lifting them now would falsely convey that the Pretoria government has taken the steps necessary to ensure this end. The US should make it clear to both the white and black leadership in South Africa that the sanctions can be lifted once it is clear that this goal will be reached, and that additional sanctions could be imposed if negotiations break down before meaningful progress is made. If additional sanctions should be required, they could consist of new sanctions, better enforcement of existing sanctions, and/or pursuit of greater international cooperation for imposing sanctions.

(2) Maintain the present US government programs of financial, legal, educational, and training assistance given to apartheid victims as authorized by the Anti-Apartheid Act and continue to encourage private organizations and corporations to participate in similar programs. Nonwhites in South Africa will continue to need such assistance until a new democratic, non-racial government can implement adequate programs of its own to help those disadvantaged by apartheid practices.

(3) Actively seek opportunities to facilitate the process of peaceful negotiations that will lead to a fully democratic society in South Africa. The US strengthened its prestige as an effective facilitator during the tripartite negotiations for the independence of Namibia. The US should capitalize on this and actively seek a role to facilitate the negotiations in South Africa. Although the US would more likely fill a supporting role rather than a direct facilitator at the negotiation table, the administration should provide any assistance possible that would enhance the outcome of the negotiations. In this way, the US can more clearly direct its support for the implementation of a fully democratic post-apartheid government, which could be very important in light of the professed socialist ideologies of the ANC and other anti-apartheid groups in South Africa.

b. Seek opportunities to enhance the stability of Southern Africa, to eliminate regional tensions, and to promote a democratic, pro-Western political and economic orientation in the region. US policy toward South Africa should support this regional goal in the following ways:

(1) Seek South Africa's cooperation and leadership to eliminate tensions and conflicts with front line states, to facilitate successful transition to independence of Namibia, and to bring about national reconciliation in Angola and Mozambique.

(2) Foster an atmosphere of interdependence and economic cooperation between South Africa and other regional nations that will promote the development and economic prosperity of the region. Southern African nations have attempted, without much success, to ban together in economic competition with South Africa. Turning this divisive effort into a regional cooperative effort, with South Africa as a partner rather than a competitor, would mutually benefit all participants.

There are many other initiatives the US is taking, or should take, which contribute to the development of the Southern African region and the realization of US regional policy goals. Those initiatives are beyond the scope of this study which looked only at US policy toward South Africa with respect to apartheid and South Africa's role in regional issues. Pursuit of the recommendations stated above will not only help reach US policy goals in South Africa, but will build a foundation upon which mutual interdependence and cooperation among Southern African nations will contribute to regional stability and development.

APPENDIX I

MAJOR APARTHEID LEGISLATION

RESTRICTIVE LEGISLATION:

Population Registration Act (1950) - classified South Africans by race.

Group Areas Act (1950) - designated areas that could be owned or inhabited only by people of specified races and required that residential areas be segregated.

Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act (1954), Black Labour Act (1964), Black Labour Regulations - established system of "influx control" to regulate the entrance and employment of blacks in white areas and restrict residence of blacks in segregated townships near white areas.

Native (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act (1952) - authorized police and other government personnel to demand production of a "pass" to enforce influx control restrictions.

Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act (1959) - created separate and potentially "independent" national states or "homelands" for each of the designated black ethnic groups.

Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act (1970) - made every black South African a citizen of an ethnic homeland, including millions of blacks who had always lived in white areas.

Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953) - reserved buildings, services, and conveniences for different racial groups.

Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949), Immorality Amendments Act (1957) - prohibited marriages and sexual relations between whites and members of other racial groups.

Bantu Education Act (1953) - placed education of blacks under separate control of the Department of Native Affairs and directed that black children receive an education markedly different than white children.

Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act (1953), Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act (1956) - prohibited blacks from joining registered unions and authorized reservation of industrial jobs for members of specified races.

Bantu Authorities Act (1951) - abolished the Natives' Representative Council, an advisory body that represented all black South Africans, and created a hierarchy of tribal organizations.

Prohibition of Political Interference Act (1968) - prohibited racially mixed political parties.

Public Safety Act (1953) - allows the government to declare a state of emergency in a specified area or over the entire country for up tc 12 months; allows suspension of a wide range of laws, restrictions on the press, arrest and detention of persons without a warrant, warrantless searches and seizures, and immunity for police from prosecution for their actions.

REFORM LEGISLATION:

Industrial Conciliation Amendment Acts (1979, 1981) - largely deracialized South African labor laws, legalized black labor unions, and abolished job reservations in all sectors except mining.

Liquor Act Amendments (1986) - permitted (but not required) hotel and restaurant owners to serve all races.

Constitutional Affairs Amendment Act (1985) - allows racially mixed political parties.

Groups Areas Amendments Act (1985) - empowered Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning to establish free trade areas and open central business districts to businesses of all racial groups.

Repeal of Immorality Amendments Act and Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1985) - allows mixed marriages and sexual relations between different races.

University racial quota policy decision (1984) - decision not to reimpose racial quotas on universities, allowing them to admit students on basis of academic qualification regardless of race.

Black Community Development Act Amendment (1984) - permits black South Africans to acquire property in black townships and to convert leasehold rights in these areas into ownership rights.

Restoration of South African Citizenship Bill (1986) - made possible the granting of South African citizenship, upon application, to blacks who permanently work and reside in townships with their families. Enables approximately 1.75 million blacks to obtain citizenship out of the estimated 9 million who lost their citizenship when "independence was granted to the Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei homelands.

Abolition of Influx Control Act (1986), Repeal of Influx Control Regulations Governing Black Employment under the Black Labour Act of 1964 and the Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945 - abolished the old passbook and replaced it with a uniform identity document for both whites and blacks (but one still coded according to race). Eased restrictions on movement within the country for blacks categorized as citizens of the Republic. Does not cover over 7 million blacks who do not qualify for citizenship who will therefore require a permit to work and reside in white areas.

Black Local Authorities Act (1982) - extended limited self-government to black townships

Tricameral Constitution (1983) - established a separate parliament for Coloureds and Asians and granted them limited national political rights. Blacks were excluded.

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